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Abstract
The expanding business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce market has created a need for firms to negotiate
business deals online. Negotiation support tools are likely to play a more critical role in B2B e-commerce.
Notwithstanding their importance, the impacts of negotiation support tools (especially automated bargaining
agents) are not well understood. This research addresses this gap by conducting a series of laboratory
experiments to investigate the impact of web-based electronic messaging, web-based negotiation support
systems (NSS), and autonomous electronic bargaining agents (EBA) on the outcomes of a multi-issue, e-
commerce negotiation. Two types of bargaining situation were investigated:  integrative and distributive
bargaining. Negotiation outcomes were assessed using joint profit/utility outcome, contract balance, and the
closeness to the efficient/Pareto frontier and the Nash bargaining solution. Findings show that web-based NSS
can significantly improve efficiency and fairness in remote integrative negotiations but not in distributive
negotiations. EBA were found to achieve outcomes comparable to but not significantly better than unassisted
human dyads. Implications for NSS and EBA implementation and research were drawn.
1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) on the Internet is fast expanding firms’ markets beyond regional and national boundaries.
While nascent e-commerce ventures focused predominantly on business-to-consumer markets, there is a growing recognition that
the business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce arena to streamline supply chains provides greater potential opportunities and is likely
to command a greater share of the e-commerce market in terms of revenue (Anderson 1997). Indeed, Merrill Lynch (Blodget and
McCabe 2000) estimated that the B2B e-commerce market would grow to US$2.5 trillion dollars in 2003. With increasing
pervasiveness of electronic markets linking B2B supply chains (e.g., GE Information Services’ Trading Process Network1 and
Perfect.com2) (Magretta 1998; Vigoroso 1999), firms are increasingly negotiating business deals online. Hence, negotiation
support tools are likely to play a critical role in B2B e-commerce.
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B2B e-commerce markets are dynamic and characterized by multiple contract attributes, fluid pricing, and terms based on fluid
back-and-forth negotiation between buyers and sellers. Unfortunately, competition on the electronic channel has also spawned
a trend of price wars and chaos in some instances (Kuttner 1998). This need not be the case if negotiation support tools could
create an opportunity to go beyond single-issue price wars by determining sellers’ and buyers’ preferences across multiple
business issues and by encouraging negotiations which create possible joint gains for all trading partners. Given the increasing
importance of negotiation support tools and the glaring paucity of negotiation studies in e-commerce (Kauffman and Walden
2000), there is a compelling need for research on computer-supported negotiation tools in B2B e-commerce. Indeed, the role and
usefulness of negotiation support tools in supporting integrative (“expand-the-pie”) and distributive (“fixed-pie”) negotiations
in B2B e-commerce warrant a thorough investigation.
Drawing from the bargaining, negotiation support systems (NSS), game theory, and social psychology literature, we conduct
experiments to investigate the outcomes of multiple-issue, e-commerce negotiations supported by web-based electronic messaging
(EM), web-based NSS (Kersten and Noronha 1999), and autonomous electronic bargaining agents (EBA) (Chavez and Maes 1996;
Oliver 1997). In evaluating the negotiation outcome of various computer-supported negotiations, we also distinguish between
integrative and distributive bargaining situations (Walton and McKersie 1965). Specifically, this study seeks answers to the
following research questions: Can web-based NSS improve the outcomes of dyadic remote negotiation in integrative and
distributive bargaining situations? Can dyadic EBA achieve outcomes comparable to those of the human negotiators in integrative
and distributive bargaining situations?
The contributions of this research are twofold. From an academic perspective, we evaluate the negotiation outcomes of industrial
buyers and sellers in a B2B e-commerce context in terms of two economic measures seldom documented in the IS negotiation
literature—the distance to the efficient/Pareto frontier (Milter et al. 1996) and the distance to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash
1950, 1953)—and two traditional dependent measures used in NSS literature—joint profit/utility outcome and contract balance
(e.g., Delaney et al. 1997; Foroughi et al. 1995). Such an integrative analysis can provide a rigorous, well-developed theoretical
vantage point from which to assess negotiation support tools’ contribution to e-commerce. From a practical perspective, this
research benchmarks the outcome effectiveness of NSS and EBA against EM in a B2B e-commerce context and informs
practitioners about the types of negotiation tools and the related design issues that are relevant for negotiations in e-commerce.
2. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives and Improving Negotiation Outcomes in E-Commerce
The study of two-party negotiation behaviors and outcomes has been approached from many disciplines, notably sociology,
psychology, organizational behavior, economics (game theory), information systems (NSS), and computer science (distributed
artificial intelligence, evolutionary computation). 
Descriptive theories of negotiation in sociology, psychology, and organizational behavior have mostly emphasized contextual
characteristics of negotiation and negotiators’ cognition and interaction processes (Bazerman and Carroll 1987; Pruitt and Rubin
1986). These descriptive theories examine the influence of individual differences (Hausken 1997; Thompson 1990), situational
determinants (Pruitt and Rubin 1986; Thompson 1990) and cognitive processes on judgment, behavior, and outcomes in
negotiation (Bazerman and Carroll 1987; Thompson 1990). In evaluating the outcome of negotiations, descriptive negotiation
theorists measure elements of social perception such as negotiators’ perceptions of the bargaining situation, the bargaining
opponent, and themselves (Thompson and Hastie 1990).
Given the increasing zero-sum nature of perfectly competitive markets on the Internet (Anderson 1997; Kuttner 1998), we are
primarily interested in the magnitude of conflict in business negotiations. Walton and Mckersie (1965) made the important
distinction between distributive (high conflict) bargaining in which parties bargain over a fixed pie, and integrative (low conflict)
bargaining in which parties may “expand the pie” through problem-solving, creativity, and identification of differences in
priorities and/or compatibility of interests.
In contrast to descriptive theories of negotiation in social psychology and organizational behavior, normative, game-theoretic
models of negotiation (Nash 1950, 1953; Rubenstein 1982) tend to assume rationality and focus on the outcome that should
emerge from these rational actions by all negotiating parties. Because of its explicit assumptions of individual rationality and
normative analyses of negotiation behavior, game theory has been simultaneously a goal and a foil against which much descriptive
experimental research has been directed (Dawes 1988; Kahneman et al. 1982).  However, normative models of negotiation have
advanced the understanding of conflict behavior by providing compelling analyses of optimal or rational behavior in competitive
situations.
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Economic measures of negotiation performance (e.g., Gupta and Livne 1988; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Nash 1950, 1953)
represent the most well-formulated specifications and benchmarks of optimal negotiation performance in terms of efficiency and
fairness. Typical measures of negotiation outcome used in most negotiation studies include joint profit/utility outcome, contract
balance (difference between negotiators’ total utility scores achieved), and the number of contracts/offers proposed (e.g., Delaney
et al. 1997; Neale and Bazerman 1985).  However, some researchers have criticized that joint outcome is not a sensitive measure
of negotiation efficiency and contract balance is not a standardized measure of negotiation fairness (Lax and Sebenius 1987; Tripp
and Sondak 1992). Consequently, some researchers have proposed to measure negotiation outcomes in terms of the distance to
the efficient/Pareto frontier and the distance to the Nash bargaining solution (Lim and Benbasat 1992; Milter et al. 1996) as
complementary measures to joint outcome and contract balance respectively. The efficient frontier represents the locus of
achievable joint evaluations from which no joint utility gains are possible. The Nash bargaining solution specifies the maximum
of the product of two parties’ utility gains. In informal terms, it is a solution from which no party has the incentive to deviate
(Nash 1950, 1953).
While the theoretical objective of the above perspectives is to predict the processes and outcomes of negotiation, the practical goal
is to help people negotiate more effectively (Raiffa 1982). Very frequently, past research and our common experiences
demonstrate that even in simple negotiations, people often settle on sub-optimal agreements, thereby “leaving money on the table”
(e.g., Camerer 1990; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). To this end, information systems can help tremendously in supporting
negotiation processes and improving negotiation outcomes by either assisting human negotiators or serving as negotiation
participants. Information systems in the former case have been much studied in the area of NSS research while those in the latter
are often referred to as automated negotiation software agents or EBA. With developments in NSS and EBA research, there is
now a significant opportunity for e-commerce technologies to help people and firms achieve superior settlements in multiple-issue,
e-commerce negotiations.
2.2 Negotiation Support Systems
The challenges of negotiation and the cognitive limitations of human negotiators have led researchers to pursue computer support
of negotiations in the form of NSS. By incorporating computer-based decision tools to assist negotiating parties reach an
agreement, NSS offer the potential to enhance the analytically complex problem-solving process and help alleviate cognitive and
socio-emotional stumbling blocks to successful negotiation (see, for example, Anson and Jelassi 1990; Jelassi and Foroughi 1989).
Foroughi (1998), Lim and Benbasat (1992), and Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) provide comprehensive surveys of the empirical
NSS research literature.
Empirical research in NSS has indicated that NSS effectiveness is likely to be moderated by the type of negotiation situation or
the amount of conflict between the negotiators. In particular, Jones (1988), Foroughi et al. (1995), and Delaney et al. (1997)
showed that in integrative negotiations, compared to dyads with no computer support, NSS-supported dyads achieved higher joint
outcomes and better contract balances (fairer outcomes). However, in distributive bargaining situations, Jones found comparable
joint outcomes for both groups. Thus, NSS may not be particularly useful in distributive negotiation situations where negotiating
parties tend to “split the difference” in coming up with a reasonably efficient and fair settlement by using a satisficing strategy
(Erickson et al. 1974; Raiffa 1982). Rangaswamy and Shell also showed that negotiators using NSS achieved better outcomes
than those using an e-mail messaging facility for negotiation. Hence, for our implementation of NSS that includes both decision
and electronic messaging support, our hypotheses for NSS-supported negotiations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1.  Summary of Research Hypotheses for NSS-Supported Negotiations
Measures of Negotiation Outcome
Type of Bargaining
Situation Joint Outcome
Contract
Balance
Distance to
Efficient
Frontier
Distance to
Nash Solution
Integrative Hypothesis 1.1
NSS > EM
Hypothesis 1.2
NSS < EM
Hypothesis 1.3
NSS < EM
Hypothesis 1.4
NSS < EM
Distributive Hypothesis 2.1
NSS = EM
Hypothesis 2.2
NSS = EM
Hypothesis 2.3
NSS = EM
Hypothesis 2.4
NSS = EM
EM: Electronic Messaging Support only NSS: Decision Support + Electronic Messaging Support
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2.3 Electronic Bargaining Agents
Although powerful and effective, NSS still require near-constant human input and communications. Recent studies of autonomous
software agents in distributed artificial intelligence and evolutionary computations disciplines have opened up exciting
possibilities for automated negotiation (e.g., Guttman and Maes 1998; Oliver 1997; Sandholm 1999) in e-commerce whereby the
negotiation roles of human buyers and sellers are performed by electronic bargaining agents (EBA). Unlike NSS supporting
human negotiators, EBA negotiation involves two or more EBA (employing artificial intelligence techniques) in a virtual
environment governed by computational rules. Examples of computational techniques include a concession model that hard-codes
a general strategy of concession in multiple-issue negotiations (Matwin et al. 1991), a case-based reasoning to planning and
support of negotiations (Sycara 1990), and artificial adaptive agents using a genetic algorithm-based learning technique (Oliver
1997). 
EBA have the potential to save human negotiators’ time and find better deals in combinatorially and strategically complex
settings. Thus, for reasons similar to NSS-supported negotiations, we hypothesize that in integrative, multiple-issue negotiations,
the distance to efficient frontier (joint profit outcome) will be shorter (higher) for EBA dyads than that for human dyads using
EM. Similarly in distributive negotiations, the distance to efficient frontier (joint profit outcome) will be no different for EBA
dyads and for human dyads with EM support. EBA do not have concerns for fairness as human negotiators do. They are often
self-interested and thus not necessarily interested in helping or hurting other agents. Thus, it would be unusual for EBA to share
more information than minimally necessary. We thus hypothesize that in integrative negotiations, the distance to Nash bargaining
solution (contract balance) will be longer for EBA dyads than that for dyads with EM support. Similarly in distributive
negotiations, the distance to Nash bargaining solution (contract balance) will be no different for EBA dyads and for dyads using
EM.
Table 2.  Summary of Research Hypotheses for EBA-Supported Negotiations
Measures of Negotiation Outcome
Type of Bargaining
Situation Joint Outcome
Contract
Balance
Distance to
Efficient
Frontier
Distance to
Nash Solution
Integrative Hypothesis 3.1
EBA > EM
Hypothesis 3.2
EBA > EM
Hypothesis 3.3
EBA < EM
Hypothesis 3.4
EBA > EM
Distributive Hypothesis 4.1
EBA = EM
Hypothesis 4.2
EBA = EM
Hypothesis 4.3
EBA = EM
Hypothesis 4.4
EBA = EM
EM: Electronic Messaging Support only EBA: Automated Decision Support only
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Experimental Design
Three series of controlled laboratory experiments were performed to investigate the impact of NSS and EBA on negotiation
outcomes. Each series examined one type of computer negotiation support: EM, NSS, or EBA. Experiments sessions of EM-
supported dyads served as the control group and were used as the baseline comparisons to evaluate the impact of NSS and EBA.
Within each series of experiment sessions, we also compared two types of negotiation situations: integrative or distributive
bargaining. We did not employ a 2 x 3 factorial design because there is no theoretical basis to compare NSS and EBA
effectiveness. Table 3 shows the number of dyads in each treatment. Subjects were recruited from our undergraduate MIS degree
program. Our design initially consisted of 72 dyads (144 subjects). However, only 69 dyads were used for final data analyses
because three  dyads were found to collude among themselves based on our log file analysis.
3.2 Independent Variables
In the integrative bargaining treatments, the assigned weights for negotiation issues were different. When the priorities of
negotiators differ, the potential for mutually beneficial tradeoffs exists and the relationship might be characterized as one of low
conflict. In the distributive bargaining treatments, negotiation issues for both buyer and seller were weighted similarly (i.e.,
assigned approximately equal utility points). This resulted in a zero-sum or high conflict bargaining situation where one party’s
gains were almost equal to the other party’s losses.
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Table 3.  The Number of Dyads in Each Treatment Group
(Male-Male/Female-Female Dyads in Parentheses)
Type of
Bargaining
Situation
Type of Negotiation Support
EM NSS EBA
Integrative 12 (6/6) 12 (6/6) 12 (6/6)
Distributive 11 (5/6) 11 (6/5) 11 (5/6)
Figure 1.  Screen Capture of Electronic Messaging (EM) Interface
Computer negotiation support was manipulated by implementing three types of tools in the form of EM, NSS, and EBA. These
tools were written in the JAVA language (as JAVA applets) and could be easily accessed through popular web browsers such as
Netscape Navigator. In the EM treatment groups, dyads negotiated with each other only through a text-based, electronic
messaging facility (see Figure 1).
In the NSS treatment groups, three computer tools were provided (see Figure 2): a text-based, electronic messaging facility (on
the lower right), an alternative evaluator (on the upper right), and an alternative generator (on the left). The alternative evaluator
(Foroughi et al. 1995) was specially developed to support alternative contract evaluation based on the preset preference scores
of the negotiator. The negotiator could plug in alternative contracts to determine the total score that could be achieved. The
alternative generator (Delaney et al. 1997) was used to support alternative generation and possible concessions and/or solutions
suggestions. Based on the preset (one’s own) and estimated (the other party’s) point structure of the negotiating parties, it
generated all of the 784 contract alternatives and displayed the best three for consideration by the negotiator.
In the EBA treatment groups, two computer tools were provided (see Figure 3): an agent tailor and an event viewer. The agent
tailor (on the top) allowed the negotiator to specify his/her contract preferences: highest acceptable price, maximum purchase
quantity, shortest acceptable warranty period, and longest acceptable delivery schedule. Using the event viewer (on the bottom),
the negotiator could track his/her bargaining agent  operation and performance. Our implementation of EBA contains a
concession-based algorithm similar to that of Matwin et al. (1991) and into which the preset preference scores of the negotiator
are built. Based on these scores and the negotiator  requirements, the EBA generates all possible alternatives, ranks them in
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descending order on total score, and proposes the alternative with the highest score to its opponent agent as its first offer. If the
offer is accepted, the two agents clinch an agreement; if rejected, the opponent agent comes back with a counter-offer. This offer
and counter-offer routine continues until the agents come to an agreement or one of the agents exhausts its possible alternatives
and sends a quit message. Within the bargaining cycle, the EBA employs some specific  ecaying function on total score to
determine which proposal to put forward next.
Figure 2.  Screen Capture of Negotiation Support System (NSS) Interface
Figure 3.  Screen Capture of Electronic Bargaining Agent (EBA) Interface
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3.3 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables are joint outcome, contract balance, the distance to the efficient/Pareto frontier, and the distance to the
Nash bargaining solution. Joint outcome is measured by the sum of total, multi-attribute utility scores of the buyer and the seller
for the final agreement. Before the utility scores can be computed, point sheets as used in Jones (1988) and Delaney et al. (1997)
are constructed to assign importance utility weights to all negotiation issues. The more important a negotiation issue is to the
negotiator, the higher the utility assigned. The utilities of the individual values are then used to calculate a total, multi-attribute
utility score.
Contract balance is computed by the absolute value of the difference between the total utility scores achieved by each negotiator.
It is zero for a balanced contract and a higher number for an unbalanced one. The distance to the efficient frontier measures the
efficiency of the final agreement. All efficient solutions on the efficient frontier must be determined before the distance can be
calculated. D1, the distance to the efficient frontier, is then computed as:
where  and  denote buyer’s and seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for efficient solution i
respectively. Here l  is the sequential index into efficient solutions, and n is the total number of efficient solutions.
The distance to the Nash bargaining solution measures the fairness of the final agreement. The Nash bargaining solution is a
settlement that maximizes the product of the utilities of the two bargainers. The Nash solution is identified before the distance
can be calculated. D2, the distance to the Nash bargaining solution, is then computed as:
where and  denote buyer’s and seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for the Nash bargaining solution
respectively.
3.4 Control Variables
Other pertinent variables not studied in this research are kept consistent to ensure adequate control and internal validity of this
study. Table 4 lists the control variables.
Table 4.  Operationalization of Control Variables
Control Variable Operational Measure
Personality of subjects Random assignment of role, dyad, and treatment group
Negotiation experience Random assignment of role, dyad, and treatment group
Gender effects Equal division of male-male and female-female dyads
Negotiator relationship No history and future possibility of dyadic negotiation
Motivation of subjects Cash rewards based on negotiation performance
Number of bargaining periods Continuous, ongoing negotiation for two hours
Non-institutional interaction Explicit separation of subjects, no interactions allowed
3.5 Experimental Task and Procedures
The experiment task was adapted from Jone’s study, which involves negotiation between a buyer (Roberts Enterprise, Inc.) and
a seller (Simo Parts Distributor) over four issues—unit price, purchased quantity, time of first delivery, and warranty period—
of a purchase agreement for turbochargers (an engine sub-component).
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In integrative negotiations, the buyer’s most important issue was quantity, followed by delivery time. The two least important
issues were warranty period and price. For the seller, price was the most important issue, followed by warranty period. Delivery
time and quantity were the least crucial issues. In distributive negotiations, the four issues were weighted similarly for the two
parties. Price was given the most weight, followed by quantity. The two least important issues were delivery time and warranty
period. A BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement—i.e., an alternative offer from another company) was provided
to both parties. This gave subjects a minimum point level to achieve in the negotiation. BATNA is crucial to computing the Nash
solution and motivating the subjects to achieve superior agreements in the negotiations.
All experiment sessions lasted two hours and were carried out by the same experiment administrator who followed standardized
guidelines and instructions.3  In  each session, subjects were randomly assigned the role of buyer or seller. This would determine
their seating positions, which were separated by partitions to prevent verbal interactions and opportunities for collusion. All
subjects were given ample time to read and understand the experiment case. Point sheets were given to the subjects after the case
had been read. Subjects were asked to do an exercise computing the utility score of an agreement to ensure that they knew how
to compute utility scores for contracts. Subjects then completed a pre-negotiation questionnaire of personal information and
outcome expectations.
At each session’s start of negotiations, subjects were explicitly told that cash rewards based on their negotiation performance
would be given at the end. All subjects underwent training in using EM, NSS, or EBA before starting negotiations. A computer
log file was used to capture all electronic interactions of the negotiators. Upon settlement, subjects completed a post-negotiation,
feedback questionnaire. At the end of each session, subjects were paid according to their negotiation performance measured by
their total score. They were warned explicitly not to reveal the experimental details to others.
4. DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
Two different questions were examined in this study. First, can web-based NSS improve the outcomes of dyadic remote
negotiation in integrative and distributive bargaining situations? Second, can dyadic EBA achieve outcomes comparable to those
of the human negotiators in integrative and distributive bargaining situations?
Prior to statistical testing, control checks on gender and negotiation experience (both data recorded in the pre-negotiation
questionnaire) in each treatment group were performed. ANOVA tests of gender and negotiation experience across six different
treatment groups showed no significant differences. 
Statistical analyses of the experiment results were performed using a two-way ANOVA model for the dependent measures of joint
outcome, contract balance, distance to the efficient frontier, and distance to the Nash bargaining solution. The analysis of each
outcome measure began with a two-way ANOVA using the type of negotiation support and bargaining situation as the main
effects. Differences in mean values of each dependent measure were identified. For each measure and each type of bargaining
situation, a one-way ANOVA was performed, followed by a series of planned comparisons among the three types of computer
negotiation support tool.4
The planned comparisons of means were carried out using a multiple-comparison t-test (Tukey's HSD test) with an alpha of 0.05
for a one-tailed test. The alpha was modified to adjust for the three types of negotiation support. As a check, non-parametric tests
were also used for these planned comparisons. The results were essentially similar to the planned multiple-comparison tests of
Tukey's HSD Test.  The results of the hypotheses tests are presented in Table 5.  Figures 4 and 5 show the mean levels of joint
outcome, contract balance, distances to the efficient frontier and the Nash bargaining solution.
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Figure 4.   Joint Outcome and Contract Balance Across All Treatment Groups
Figure 5.  Distance to Efficient Frontier and Nash Solution Across All Treatment Groups
5. DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
5.1 Results for Negotiations with NSS support
In integrative negotiations, compared to EM-supported dyads, NSS-supported dyads were able to achieve significantly higher joint
outcomes. This result concurs with Delaney et al.’s (1997) and Jones’s (1988) findings. NSS-supported dyads were also able to
achieve significantly more efficient agreements (in terms of the distance to the efficient/Pareto frontier). When fairness of
negotiation agreements is measured by contract balance, unlike Delaney et al.’s and Foroughi et al.’s (1995) results, there were
no significant differences. However, when fairness of settlements is measured by the distance to the Nash bargaining solution,
NSS-supported dyads achieved significantly fairer negotiation outcomes. Therefore, we can conclude that our web-based NSS
can significantly improve outcomes of remote negotiation in integrative bargaining situations.
In distributive negotiations, results show that our hypotheses were justified. Similar to Jones’s findings in distributive negotiations,
there were no significant differences in negotiation outcomes of NSS-supported dyads and EM-supported dyads. Therefore, unlike
the case of Foroughi et al.’s study, our web-based NSS proved not to be very useful in achieving superior settlements in remote,
distributive negotiations.
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Table 5.  Summary of Statistical Tests and Hypothesis Tests
Dependent
Variables
Type of
Bargaining
Situation
Type of Negotiation Support
Mean (Standard Deviation)
Hypothesis
Level of
Sig.
Hypothesis
SupportedEM NSS EBA
Joint 
Outcome
Integrative 117.83
(12.15)
129.83
(4.51)
113.83
(10.72)
H1.1
NSS > EM
p < 0.013 Yes
H3.1
EBA > EM
p < 0.576 No
Distributive 100.27
(5.33)
102.82
(2.04)
102.36
(2.11)
H2.1
NSS = EM
p < 0.222 Yes
H4.1
EBA = EM
p < 0.356 Yes
Contract 
Balance
Integrative 13.83
(11.83)
10.83
(6.95)
11.67
(12.66)
H1.2
NSS < EM
p < 0.776 No
H3.2
EBA > EM
p < 0.875 No
Distributive 6.82
(7.99)
6.82
(4.96)
4.55
(3.93)
H2.2
NSS = EM
p < 0.999 Yes
H4.2
EBA = EM
p < 0.641 Yes
Distance to
Efficient Frontier
Integrative 8.33
(8.57)
1.01
(2.39)
11.40
(8.19)
H1.3
NSS < EM
p < 0.039 Yes
H3.3
EBA < EM
p < 0.535 No
Distributive 3.52
(3.65)
1.87
(1.36)
2.09
(1.41)
H2.3
NSS = EM
p < 0.254 Yes
H4.3
EBA = EM
p < 0.352 Yes
Distance to 
Nash Bargaining
Solution
Integrative 16.59
(8.07)
7.06
(6.35)
19.31
(6.94)
H1.4
NSS < EM
p < 0.007 Yes
H3.4
EBA > EM
p < 0.625 No
Distributive 7.46
(4.83)
5.42
(3.35)
4.84
(2.06)
H2.4
NSS = EM
p < 0.391 Yes
H4.4
EBA = EM
p < 0.220 Yes
A key result obtained in this study is that our web-based NSS helped subjects in integrative negotiations improve both outcome
efficiency and fairness of settlements significantly. Subjects without NSS support tended to “satisfice,” i.e., stopped negotiating
when a satisfactory solution had been reached. Additional information provided by decision aids of NSS had the effect of raising
negotiators’ expectations. It gave negotiators direction on how to go about searching for efficient and fair agreements. Our log
file shows that time to reach agreements was longer for NSS-assisted dyads than that for EM-supported dyads. This suggests that,
in situations where integrative solutions were possible, negotiating parties considered their options more thoroughly to achieve
more efficient and fairer settlements.
The implications of our web-based NSS findings for practice are clear. There is potential for web-based NSS to benefit business
negotiators involved in integrative remote decision-making activities by supporting alternative generation and evaluation as well
as suggesting contracts that optimize values and make available joint gains. In view of the flourishing number of B2B e-commerce
portals such as EC Portal,5 Bz2Biz.com,6 and Perfect.com, the inclusion of web-based NSS in such e-commerce portals can help
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remote buyers and sellers engage in more optimal and efficient multiple-issue business negotiations. In these B2B portal sites,
buyers are able to submit RFQs while sellers are also able to submit RFPs online. These sites act as the intermediaries between
buyers and sellers by standardizing the multiple dimensions (e.g., warranty, delivery, and financing) of business contracts so as
to facilitate automated auctioning and online negotiation. The potential of web-based NSS is thus especially pertinent for online
supplier-manufacturer and manufacturer-retailer/wholesaler dyads (Frazier and Rody 1991; Wilson et al. 1991) in industrial
procurement negotiations. 
5.2 Results for Negotiations with EBA Support
There were no significant differences in negotiation outcomes between EBA dyads and EM-supported dyads in both integrative
and distributive negotiations. Contrary to our hypotheses for integrative negotiations, EBA dyads only achieved comparable
negotiation outcomes (in terms of joint outcome, contract balance, distances to the efficient frontier and Nash bargaining solution)
compared to EM-supported dyads. Therefore, we conclude that our dyadic EBA can achieve negotiation outcomes comparable
to those of the human negotiators in both integrative and distributive bargaining situations. This finding is similar to Oliver’s
(1997) results, which showed that EBA do not perform significantly better or worse than human dyads in terms of negotiation
efficiency and the ability to make integrative tradeoffs.
As part of the post hoc statistical tests, we also compared the negotiation outcomes of EBA dyads and NSS-supported dyads. In
distributive negotiations, there were no significant differences. However, in integrative negotiations, EBA dyads obtained
significantly lower joint outcomes (p < 0.001) and significantly less efficient agreements (in terms of the distance to the
efficient/Pareto frontier) (p < 0.003) than NSS-supported dyads. In terms of contract balance, there were no significant differences
in fairness of agreements achieved by both dyadic groups. However, in terms of the distance to the Nash bargaining solution, NSS-
supported dyads achieved significantly fairer negotiation outcomes (p < 0.001) than EBA dyads. Thus, we conclude that a
concession-model implementation of EBA did not perform as well as the human negotiators assisted by NSS in integrative
negotiations.
There are several plausible reasons why EBA dyads did not outperform the human dyads with only EM support (i.e., without NSS)
in integrative negotiations. The lack of communication channels between buyer and seller in EBA-supported dyads may have
impeded information sharing and joint-problem solving possibilities. Indeed, Sebenius (1992) proposes that “to generate gainful
options, it is normally helpful for information to be shared openly, communication enhanced, creativity spurred, joint-problem
solving emphasized, and hostilities productively channeled.” 
The fixed strategy of concession adopted by EBA may be too simple, lacking sophisticated machine learning abilities. Particularly,
the implementation of EBA strategy in terms of evaluating total score (joint outcome) perpetuates the fixed-pie bias—a tendency
for negotiators to assume that their own interests directly conflict with those of the other party (Bazerman and Carroll 1987;
Thompson and Hastie 1990). This bias may have interfered with EBA’s abilities to discover mutually beneficial tradeoffs.
Several implications for practical application of EBA can be drawn. First, using EBA saves time and efforts of human negotiators
without jeopardizing the outcomes of negotiations. Hence, EBA are suitable for supporting negotiations in e-commerce, which
often take place across different time zones in a global, distributed manner. Second, the strategies of concession adopted by EBA
have a huge impact on their performance. EBA developers should keep in mind the importance of bargaining strategies as well
as their flexibility. Ideally, such bargaining strategies should lead to negotiation outcomes comparable to, if not better than, that
of human negotiators assisted by NSS.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Given the increasing importance of negotiation support tools in B2B electronic market portal sites and the glaring paucity of
negotiation studies in e-commerce, there is a compelling need for research on negotiation tools in B2B e-commerce. In this
research, we investigate the comparative performance of three types of e-commerce negotiation support tools (EM, NSS, and
EBA) in either an integrative or distributive bargaining context. Our findings show that web-based NSS can significantly improve
negotiation efficiency and fairness in remote integrative negotiations but not in distributive negotiations. Although EBA do not
significantly outperform human negotiators in both integrative and distributive bargaining, such agents are able to achieve
negotiation outcomes comparable to unassisted human dyads.
The majority of previous empirical studies on computer negotiation support used joint outcome and contract balance to measure
the efficiency and fairness of negotiation outcomes respectively. The present study normalized these measures based on the well-
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established Nash bargaining theory and compared negotiation outcomes in terms of the distances to the efficient/Pareto frontier
and the Nash bargaining solution. Our results show that contract balance as an unnormalized measurement of the fairness of
negotiation outcomes may not be a sensitive dependent measure, in contrast to Delaney et al.’s (1997) argument. On the other
hand, we also find that joint outcome and the distance to efficient frontier are negatively correlated (r = -0.373, p = 0.002).
We recognize that our research results above are subject to some limitations. Our research methodology of laboratory
experimentation may have precluded some levels of realism in real-world negotiations while the use of student subjects may also
have limited the findings’ generalizaility. Our implementation of EBA algorithm in terms of a concession strategy may not have
been the most optimal one and is subject to further improvements in future research. Our findings open several avenues for future
research. First, we are interested to pursue further research into investigating the negotiation process dynamics of dyads assisted
by different tools of EM, NSS, and EBA. This can be achieved by analyzing our log files of all experiment sessions and by
plotting out the “negotiation dances” (Milter et al. 1996) of all intermediate offers and counter-offers of negotiating parties.
Second, based on our data from experiment questionnaires, we intend to study the social-psychological measures of negotiation
processes and outcomes. This is especially pertinent because negotiators’ perceptions may differ substantially from objective
economic analyses (Thompson and Hastie 1990). Future research in these directions would be able to provide us with deeper
insights into the economic effectiveness and psychological value of negotiation support tools in B2B e-commerce.
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